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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Abbey,”1 is an eight year old girl who has been repeatedly
raped by her father. One day, Abbey disclosed to her mother that she
had been sexually abused by her father. The mother immediately sought
medical and mental health treatment and the assistance of the Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services (DCS).
At an adjudicatory hearing2 in front of a juvenile court judge,
DCS provided physical evidence, medical testimony, forensic interview
testimony, father’s psychosexual report, mental health testimony, and
party testimony to establish the allegations set forth in the Petition
alleging dependency and neglect. During the hearing, the father
conceded that the child appeared to have been raped, but he denied the
child’s allegations that he was the culprit. The father presented the
testimony of friends and family to attest to his good character. After a
full hearing, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that
the allegations in the petition were true and entered an order awarding
custody to the mother and supervised visitation for the father.

1

While the name and the situation are both fictional, the authors have, through their
extensive experience in juvenile courts, seen similar facts and circumstances occur
all too often.
2
Most “trials” in juvenile courts are referred to as “adjudicatory hearings.”

2014]

ELIMINATING THE SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE

3

The father filed a timely appeal to the circuit court, wherein the
matter was retried in its entirety, as if the juvenile proceedings never
happened.3 At the beginning of the circuit court trial, the father sought
a dismissal based on DCS’s failure to comply with the circuit court’s
formal rules governing the proceedings (i.e. no witness list presented to
the opposing party within ten days of trial). Based upon this
technicality, the proceedings were limited to testimony by the parties.
This procedural decision left a DCS caseworker and the mother to testify
that the father abused the child while the father testified that he did not.
Although the medical and mental health reports were part of the juvenile
court record, the circuit court4 would not allow them to be entered into
evidence without the authors of those reports to authenticate them;
however, since the authors were excluded as witnesses, the reports were
not allowed in as evidence.5 Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that
the testimony presented on that day could not establish clear and
convincing evidence of dependency and neglect and the court, therefore,
reinstated the father’s custody as it existed prior to the petition being
filed.
The parties could not reasonably appeal to the Court of Appeals
because the only appealable record was the one created in circuit court,
which, admittedly, was without sufficient evidence to warrant an
alternate decision. As a result of the father’s second bite at the apple
and the unnecessary formality of the appellate venue, Abbey was
returned to the custody of her abusive father, without regard to the prior
findings of the juvenile court.
Decisions from juvenile courts should not be disregarded. They
were designed over a century ago with a purpose that has endured over
time: keep the focus on rehabilitating children and families, not on
formality.6 From the inception of Tennessee’s juvenile court system to
the present, juvenile proceedings have evolved to ensure that the goals
of the court are met while ensuring due process to the litigants the court
is designed to serve. Changes that have occurred over the years include:
(1) notice of the right to legal counsel;7 (2) free appointment of legal

3

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159(a) (West 2010).
Although Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(a) provides the circuit court
with appellate jurisdiction over this type of action, many counties allow the judge of
the Chancery Court to preside by interchange, pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 17-2-202 (a)(2).
5
The excluded witnesses already authenticated the reports through testimony during
the, now irrelevant, juvenile court proceeding.
6
Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice For all: Extending the Right to
a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 839 (1994).
7
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126(b) (West 2012). Although the right to counsel was
acknowledged in case law for many years, in 2008 the code was modified to include
4
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counsel for qualifying parties;8 (3) juvenile proceedings presided over
by a judge with a law license;9 and (4) full adjudicatory hearings
governed by the rules of procedure and evidence.10
Admittedly, a de novo appellate trial to the circuit court may
have been appropriate prior to these improvements to procedural
safeguards. However, with the implementation of the additional
safeguards, thus assuring due process, the lack of deference afforded to
juvenile court decisions serves no legitimate purpose other than to
provide a retrial, or second bite at the apple, often resulting in delay and
increased risk to the vulnerable youth of this state.
This article will, in Section II, detail the evolution of the juvenile
court, emphasizing the purpose and specialty nature of the juvenile court
and the history of the appellate process and standard of review. In
Section III, this article will detail the basis for changing the juvenile
appellate structure and standard of review. Lastly, Section IV of this
article proposes a new appellate standard that will both serve to
reinforce the public policy that spawned the creation of the specialized
juvenile courts and, more importantly, to facilitate the best interests of
the children of Tennessee.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
A. The Juvenile Court and its Purpose

Like it did for many states across the country, the twentieth
century brought an evolution in the Tennessee judicial system. Courts
began to recognize the need for distinctive goals and procedures in

the right to counsel for both children and adults. TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-126(a)
(West 2012).
8
TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-126(a)(3) (West 2012); see NYASHA N. JUSTICE & LESLIE
BARRETT KINCAID, A RE-ASSESSMENT OF TENNESSEE’S JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
FOSTER CARE CASES 70-71 (2005). (Physical copies of the report are maintained by
the Administrative Office of Courts).
9
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-106(a) (West 2013) (stating that a judge must be
"authorized to practice law in the courts of this state").
10
TENN. R. JUV. P. 28.; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982)
(holding that the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard denied parents due
process and that due process required that the case be proven by clear and
convincing evidence); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981)
(holding that parents faced with the prospect of losing their parental rights are
entitled to the due process protections guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution,
article I, section 8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which,
at a minimum required representation when the particular facts warranted such);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (stating that because of the interests at
stake in a termination of parental rights case, fundamental fairness required that
parents be afforded a hearing on adequate notice).
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matters addressing the confinement and care of children.11 Along with
specific processes intended to further the goal of rehabilitation and
protection, specific judges were recognized to do the work of the
juvenile court as well.12 Finally, the juvenile courts firmly established
the nature of cases and controversies for their venue.13
In 1899, Cook County, Illinois established the first juvenile
court in the country.14 Like its successors, the court provided a
framework that viewed child offenders15 “as child victims[,] less
accountable for their condition and more entitled to rehabilitation than
[in need of] punishment.”16 Unlike some of the other early juvenile
courts, however, Tennessee provided for the treatment of both
“delinquent” and “dependent” children.17 The former definition applied
to children accused of criminal-like conduct18 and the latter applied to
children lacking appropriate parental care.19
While procedures varied across the country, all juvenile courts
were premised upon the doctrine of parens patriae,20 establishing the
role of the court as consistent with that of a parent, providing both care
and discipline. As a quasi-parent, juvenile courts were, and still are
today, required to consider the best interests of the children for whom
the courts were created to serve, whether in meting out sanctions for
unlawful conduct or in prescribing custody to provide for the welfare of
children without appropriate guardianship.21
Although over a century has passed since Tennessee created the
juvenile courts, the purpose of the court remains relatively unchanged:
to “provide for the care, protection, and wholesome moral, mental and
physical development of children;”22 to “…remove from children
committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences

11

1911 Tenn. Pub. Acts 111.
Id. at 113.
13
Id. at 111.
14
Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1191 (1970).
15
Children who commit crimes are not deemed criminals, but are generally
described as “offenders” or “delinquents.”
16
Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the Juvenile Court: A
Centennial Celebration of the Juvenile Court 1899-1999, 49 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 4, 4
(1998).
17
1911 Tenn. Pub. Acts 111-12.
18
Id. Crimes committed by juveniles are considered civil offenses since the purpose
of adjudications is to provide treatment and rehabilitation, not punishment.
19
Id.
20
In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (The state as parens
patriae has a special duty to protect minors).
21
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 49-50 (1905).
22
TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-101(a)(1) (West 2009).
12
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of criminal behavior and substitute therefor a program of treatment,
training and rehabilitation;”23 and to “[p]rovide a simple judicial
procedure through which this part [Chapter 37] is executed and enforced
and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their
constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.”24
If the purpose of the juvenile court seems broad and relatively
stagnant since the court’s creation, the role of the juvenile court judge
seems nearly herculean in both dimension and evolution. Unlike the
purpose of the court itself, the role of its arbiter, the juvenile judge, has
changed substantially over the second half of the twentieth century. One
of the first juvenile judges, Julian Mack, aptly described the early role
of the juvenile court judge:
The child who must be brought into court should, of
course, be made to know that he is face to face with the
power of the state, but he should at the same time, and
more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object
of its care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the
court-room are out of place in such hearings. The judge
on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the
bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated
at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on
occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the
lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial
dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his
work.25
The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which
a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by
talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in
which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the
State provided guidance and help to save him from a downward career.26
The image of the compassionate judge and the procedural
leeway afforded these presumed benevolent courts were considerably
eroded after Judge McGhee of the Gila County Superior Court in
Arizona, serving as the juvenile judge, committed a fourteen-year-old
boy to a state-operated reform school.27 What was the crime that caused

23

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(2) (West 2009).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(4) (West 2009).
25
Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
26
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (citing Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARV. L. REV. 104 120 (1909)).
27
Id. at 7.
24
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Gerald Gault to be committed until his twenty-first birthday? Although
the child denied it, he was found by Judge McGhee to have made a lewd
phone call—a prank call to his neighbor.28
The United States Supreme Court, citing numerous errors and
comparing the process afforded by Judge McGhee to a “kangaroo
court,”29 found that the lack of formal court processes denied Gault his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.30 The Court found that
Gault had been denied timely notice of the hearing, at which he was
committed to a reform school; denied notification of the right to counsel
and appointment of counsel; denied the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses (the victim) against him; denied the privilege against
self-incrimination; denied the right to appeal; and denied a record from
which an appropriate appeal could be made.31
Modern juvenile judges are expected to maintain the altruistic
tone of the early years of the court. At the same time however, absent
extraordinary circumstances, they must carefully safeguard the rights of
children and parents, as delineated by Gault, as well as establish the
right of parents to be free from the custodial interference of the state.32
Juvenile judges are called upon to serve the traditional roles of factfinder and applier of the law, but also to administer probation
departments,33 school programs,34 and administrative boards.35 Judges
often advocate for benefits and services necessary to rehabilitate
children. Finally, in perhaps their most arduous role, juvenile judges

Id. at 7-8 (The caller alleged that Mr. Gault, made statements such as, “Are your
cherries ripe today?” and “Do you have big bombers?”).
29
Id. at 28.
30
Id. at 58-59; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 13-59.
32
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W. 2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993) (due to the right to privacy
that parents enjoy, absent substantial harm or risk thereof, there is no compelling
justification to interfere with this fundamental right); In re Knott, 197 S.W. 1097,
1098 (Tenn. 1917) (although a parent’s right to rear his/her child is protected from
state interference, it may be removed where the child’s welfare is materially
jeopardized); State ex. rel. Bethell v. Kilvington, 45 S.W. 433, 435 (Tenn. 1898)
(stating that a parent’s right to the custody of his/her child is fundamental, but not
inalienable).
33
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-105 (West 2011).
34
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-702 (West 2011).
35
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105–89) (ASFA) (as codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(C). The Act requires the juvenile court to, at a minimum, conduct
a review hearing within 12 months from the time a child enters foster care to make
decisions or recommendations on the permanent home for a child. See also Kurtis
A. Kemper, Construction and Application by State Courts of the Federal Adoption
and Safe Families Act and Its Implementing State Statutes, 10 A.L.R 173 (Westlaw
as of Jan. 27, 2014).
28
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must collaborate with and provide leadership to community partners,
both governmental and private, that provide the social and protective
services for the children and families the court serves.36
At the inception of the juvenile courts, the “county judge” 37 or
Chairman of the County Courts was vested with exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases coming within the Juvenile Court Act of 1911. 38 The
Judges of the circuit, chancery, and all other inferior courts, must be
elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are
to be assigned.39 Every judge must be thirty years of age, a resident of
the State for five years, and a circuit or district resident for one year.40
The term of service is established as eight years.41
By 1982, every county had a general sessions court.42 The
general sessions court, except in counties with a separate juvenile court
established by private act,43 has juvenile court jurisdiction.44 Only
general sessions judges or private act juvenile judges with a law license
in Tennessee may order commitment of a juvenile to the Department of
Correction, and currently, every general sessions and juvenile judge in
Tennessee is a lawyer.45

36

Edward Leonard, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 2 (1992).
37
Until a 1978 Tennessee Constitutional Revision, the “county court” met quarterly
and consisted of justices of the peace with quasi-judicial powers. One such member
of the antiquated “court” was the “county judge” who presided over the quarterly
“court”. This group of officials was replaced subsequently by the County Executive
(now County Mayor) and the County Commission, ceding all judicial authority in
1978. Shortly thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated a provision that
purported to substitute the position of “county executive” in place of “county judge”,
holding that the judicial authority of juvenile court cannot lawfully be vested in the
county executive; thus, statutory section purporting to vest in county executive “the
judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, county chairman, or other
elected official of county government” is unconstitutional. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 4;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 5-606. Waters v. State ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756, 760
(Tenn. 1979).
38
1911 Tenn. Pub. Acts 113.
39
TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
The Juvenile Court Restructure Act of 1982, as amended, is codified in TENN.
CODE ANN. §§37-1-201 to 214.
43
Tennessee has 98 juvenile courts with 109 juvenile court judges and 45
Magistrates. Of these 98 courts, 17 are designated "Private Act" juvenile courts while
the remaining 81 are general sessions courts with juvenile jurisdiction.
44
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-203 (West 2009).
45
See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (lay judge allowed so long as trial de
novo before licensed judge followed); see also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S.
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Juvenile judges across the state preside over a broad category of
cases involving children and their families. Juvenile courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings involving minors alleged to be
delinquent, unruly, dependent and neglected.46 Juvenile Courts also
have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit, chancery and probate courts in
some areas.47
B. History of the Juvenile Appellate Standard
The current appellate process for juvenile matters has been in
place, in some form, since 1953.48 From 1911 to 1953, prior to the
juvenile appellate process being codified, Tennessee courts
acknowledged the statutory silence on the juvenile appellate process,
but recognized the limited jurisdiction of juvenile courts, thus deeming
them inferior to circuit courts. Given the general jurisdiction of the
circuit courts, a right to seek review of the decision of the juvenile court
was obtainable via writ of certiorari.49 Therefore, despite the absence
of a statutory juvenile appellate remedy for the first four decades after
the juvenile court’s creation, the Code allowed circuit courts to carry
discretionary juvenile appellate review upon petition of writ of
certiorari.50
To understand why change is necessary, it is important to
understand the evolutionary process that resulted in the appellate
standard’s current posture. Leading up to the Legislature’s codification
of the appellate process in 1953, the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed the issue in four notable cases that spanned forty years. In
1905, prior to the creation of juvenile courts, Staples v. Brown grappled
with the broader issue of the breadth of the circuit court’s appellate

618 (1976) (Justice Stevens' dissent points to serious flaws in a system relying on
trial de novo in order to justify lay judges.)
46
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-103.
47
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-104.
48
1953 Tenn. Pub. Acts 107. The 1953 rule was that juvenile court decisions were
to be appealed to the circuit court within two days. This rule was amended in 1955
to say that appeals were to the circuit court, but no time frame was provided. 1955
Tenn. Pub. Acts 687. The rule was again changed in 1957 to say that juvenile
appeals were to be filed in the circuit court within five days and that the matter was
to be tried de novo with witnesses. 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1077.
49
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (7th ed. 1999). Blacks defines ”certiorari” as “[a]n
extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower
court to deliver the record in the case for review… [I]n the United States, it
[certiorari] became a general appellate remedy.”
50
TENN. CODE (SHANNON’S ED.) §§ 4853, 4854, 6063, and 6072.
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jurisdiction as it related to inferior courts.51 In 1918, State v. Bockman
evaluated the inferiority of the juvenile court to the circuit court and, as
a result, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the circuit court had
initial appellate review of juvenile decisions.52 In 1940, In re Scalf’s
Adoption addressed not only the juvenile court’s inferior jurisdiction,
but also why a de novo appeal to the circuit court was appropriate and
better served the due process of families.53 Finally, in 1953, Doster v.
State reiterated the importance of the de novo appellate standard of
review despite the anomalous result of granting two jury trials to a single
alleged perpetrator.54
The remainder of this section will discuss, in detail, the
aforementioned four cases that preceded the codification of the
appellate standard for juvenile matters. The case analysis will be
followed by a discussion of the statutory changes addressing juvenile
appeals, and finally, an examination of the current state of juvenile
appeals.
1.

Staples v. Brown

The Staples case is a Tennessee Supreme Court case from 1905
wherein the Plaintiff and Defendant both sought to be elected as the city
attorney of Harriman, Tennessee.55 When the official ballots were
calculated, Defendant won the election by one vote (172 to 171).56
Plaintiff contested the election, alleging that he received 173 votes,
while Defendant only received 168 votes.57 The Harriman City Council
heard the case and decided it “would abide by the count made by the
officers holding the election, and dismissed the contest.”58 Next, the
Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court.59 The circuit court dismissed
Plaintiff’s appeal on the basis that the statute vesting original
jurisdiction to hear the contest in the city council, did not provide for an
appeal from its judgment.60 Plaintiff refiled his appeal via a petition for
certiorari to the circuit court, seeking a retrial on the merits of his case.61

51

Staples v. Brown, 85 S.W. 254 (Tenn. 1905).
State v. Bockman, 201 S.W. 741 (Tenn. 1918).
53
In re Scalf’s Adoption, 144 S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. 1940).
54
Doster v. State, 260 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn. 1953).
55
Staples v. Brown, 85 S.W. 254, 254 (Tenn. 1905).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 255.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
52
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Plaintiff’s petition was dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the
council was final and not entitled to appellate review.62
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the circuit court’s finding was
reversed and the Court held that the circuit court had both appellate and
original jurisdiction over city council decisions, as it was an inferior
body.63 The Court, quoting the Tennessee Code, stated that circuit
courts were vested with “appellate jurisdiction of all suits and actions of
whatsoever nature or description, instituted before any inferior
jurisdiction, whether brought before them by appeal, certiorari, or in any
other manner prescribed by law.”64 In its holding, the Staples Court
found that circuit courts were vested with the discretion to exercise
appellate jurisdiction, via writ of certiorari, in cases where the law
provided no appeal or as a substitute for appeal, and that these appellate
matters were to be reviewed upon the merits.65
In instances where the right to appeal a particular cause was not
statutorily provided, Staples and Shannon’s Code, created a common
law right to appellate review for parties who received adverse decisions
from jurisdictions inferior to circuit courts. Although the context of
Staples is not directly related to juvenile law, the Tennessee Supreme
Court later expanded the Staples ruling to juvenile cases.
2.

State v. Bockman

Bockman is a Tennessee Supreme Court case decided in 1918
involving a minor who was adjudicated delinquent by the Overton
County Juvenile Court.66 The Petitioner appealed the juvenile court’s
finding directly to the Tennessee Supreme Court.67 Upon review, the
Petitioner justified his direct appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court by
arguing that the importance of the juvenile court negated any necessity
to allocate it as inferior to the circuit court.68 Although the Court agreed
with the Petitioner that the juvenile court performed very important
work, the Court concluded that the juvenile court was inferior to the
circuit court.69 In support of that conclusion, the Court noted that the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction was limited, while circuit jurisdiction was

62

Id.
Id.
64
Id. at 256 (citing Tennessee Code § 6063 & 6072).
65
Id.at 256.
66
State v. Bockman, 201 S.W. 741, 742 (Tenn. 1918).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 742.
63
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general.70 In fact, the Court noted that circuit jurisdiction was “wider
than that of any other court known to [the] judicial system.”71
Although the Court’s finding that juvenile courts were inferior
to circuit courts seemingly triggered the Staples ruling, the Court
continued its analysis by evaluating the appellate jurisdiction of the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.72 The Court
determined that statutes governing the jurisdiction of both appellate
courts limited their jurisdiction to correcting errors from inferior courts
of law and equity.73 As the Court could not find that that the juvenile
court was either a court of law or equity, neither the Court of Appeals
nor the Tennessee Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review juvenile
court decisions.74
Relying upon the Staples decision, the Court ultimately
determined that the circuit court had discretionary appellate review, via
writ of certiorari, over juvenile matters.75 Therefore, the Court held that
the Petitioner’s appeal had been filed in error with the Tennessee
Supreme Court and the matter was dismissed for the Petitioner to re-file
his appeal in circuit court.76
Bockman’s determination that juvenile courts were inferior to
the circuit court placed the question of appellate review of juvenile
decisions squarely within the Staples decision.77 The Bockman decision
had enunciated two primary holdings: (1) despite the absence of a law
providing for an appellate remedy from juvenile court decisions, an
appellate remedy existed via writ of certiorari to the circuit court; and
(2) neither the Court of Appeals nor the Tennessee Supreme Court had
direct appellate review of juvenile court decisions.
3.

In re Scalf’s Adoption

In re Scalf’s Adoption is a Tennessee Supreme Court case from
1940 wherein the Petitioner filed for custody of two minor children who
he desired to adopt.78 Child Services had custody of the children and
contested the petition, alleging that the Petitioner was not suitable for

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id. at 743.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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custody.79 The Petitioner succeeded in obtaining an order directing
Child Services to turn over the children.80 Child Services sought and
was awarded a stay of the juvenile court’s custody order pending their
appeal to circuit court.81 The circuit court declined to review the case,
indicating that appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Court of
Appeals.82 Child Services then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the circuit court.83 The writ petition was dismissed by the circuit court.84
Child Services appealed the dismissal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court.85
In analyzing this case, the Court recalled its conclusion in
Bockman, wherein no right of appeal from the judgment of the juvenile
court was given, thus leaving review in circuit court upon petition for
certiorari.86 However, in this instance, there was an additional statute at
issue. A juvenile court was created for Knox County by a specific
chapter of the Private Acts of 1913 (“Knox County Act”). Although the
jurisdiction was largely the same as that provided for in the general acts,
the Knox County Act included a specific appellate provision stating that
“an appeal may be taken from the final order of the court to the Circuit
Court.”87
The Knox County Act was amended in 1925 to change the name
of the court to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.88 This
amendment granted the newly named juvenile court original and
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery court to hear
divorces, including the related determinations regarding custody and
support.89 The Petitioner argued that since the Knox County Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court was afforded concurrent jurisdiction with
circuit and chancery courts, the amendment also afforded the Knox
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court the same appellate
review afforded to circuit and chancery decisions.90 The Court
disagreed stating that, after review, it found no provision in the Act of
1925 that illustrated legislative intent that appeals in ordinary juvenile
cases were to be taken to the Court of Appeals rather than to the circuit

79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 773.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing Brockman, 201 S.W. at 741).
87
Id. (quoting 1913 Tenn. Priv. Acts 896).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 773-74.
80

14

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 3:1

court.91 Instead, the Court gave the following lengthy explanation for
why it believed that a de novo appellate review by the circuit court better
served the parties:
Such cases involving custody of delinquent and
dependent children are quite generally informally heard,
the parties not being represented by counsel. To require
the preservation of a bill of exceptions, motion for a new
trial, and other steps necessary in the removal of a case
from a court of law to the Court of Appeals, would
deprive the provision for appeal contained in these
statutes of most of its usefulness. Parties involved,
without professional advice, would be utterly incapable
of perfecting such an appeal. The appeal contemplated
by the Acts of 1913 and the amendment thereto was an
appeal similar to that taken from a magistrate’s court to
the circuit court, with the hearing de novo in the circuit
court. The Act of 1923 further provided that such
appeals should be heard by the circuit judge either in
term time or in vacation with a view of hastening
disposition of the matter. Did such appeals go to the
Court of Appeals, necessarily a hearing there would be
delayed, at least, until the next term time of that court.92
The Court next addressed the Petitioner’s argument that the
Court of Appeals Act extended the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to “all
civil cases, except those involving constitutional questions.”93 The
Court refused to find that the legislature intended such a broad
interpretation of the standard because that would extend the Court of
Appeals appellate review to justices of the peace.94 Instead, the Court
concluded that the legislature intended for the Court of Appeals’
appellate review to be limited to appeals from courts of law and equity.95
Therefore, the Court reversed the dismissal by the circuit court and
remanded the case to the circuit court for a de novo hearing.96
The Scalf decision was important because it was the first case to
articulate the rationale for juvenile court appeals being heard on a de
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Id. at 774.
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Id. (citing 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 236).
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Id. Justices of the peace served as the precursor to today’s general sessions courts.
These courts have limited jurisdiction, but unlike the juvenile court, they are not
courts of record – making any appeal other than a de novo trial futile.
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novo basis – not just a de novo review,97 but a new trial. In summary,
the Scalf Court’s reasoning for its decision was supported by the
following findings: (1) juvenile proceedings were informal and
generally executed without legal counsel; (2) navigating the formal
procedural requirements to perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeals
without counsel would be difficult, if not impossible; and (3) juvenile
courts were similar to magistrate courts where the parties were in need
of a hasty determination and the delay imposed by the Court of Appeals
process would be harmful.98 This same reasoning, although now a
misconception, has persisted since 1940.
4.

Doster v. State

Doster is a 1953 Tennessee Supreme Court case in which a
minor was adjudicated delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Weakley
County following a jury trial and committed to a reform school.99 Doster
appealed the juvenile court’s commitment order to the circuit court via
writ of certiorari, demanding a de novo trial, that is, a trial by a jury in
the same manner as if the proceedings in the juvenile court had never
taken place.100 The circuit court rejected Doster’s argument and instead
insisted that the court was under an obligation to confine its review to
the juvenile court record.101 After reviewing the record, “the circuit
court dismissed Doster’s petition for certiorari.”102 Doster appealed the
circuit court’s finding to the Court of Appeals where the Court affirmed
the circuit court’s ruling.103 Doster then appealed the matter to the
Tennessee Supreme Court.104
Upon review, the Court reiterated its finding from Bockman that,
with no specific right to appeal in the juvenile statute, Doster was
required to appeal to the circuit court via writ of certiorari.105 Having
appropriately followed the Bockman rule, the question then turned to
whether Doster’s case should have been heard de novo.106 Although the
Court had previously issued an opinion indicating that circuit courts
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A de novo review is the appellate standard of review by which most civil appeals
are weighed. Under this “review” standard, an appellate court reviews the evidence
presented before the trial court to reach an independent conclusion.
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Scalf, 144 S.W.2d at 794.
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Doster, 260 S.W.2d at 279.
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were to hear juvenile cases on their merits (without using the phrase “de
novo”),107 the Court ruled that the holding in Scalf specifically reiterated
that holding and provided a clear explanation of the propriety of a de
novo appellate trial.108
Although the Court noted the thoughtful opinion the Court of
Appeals delivered earlier in the case, it ultimately reversed both the
Court of Appeals and circuit court’s rulings. The Court found that the
Jones and Scalf rulings properly required a de novo appellate review by
the circuit court, even if such would require the case to be tried on its
merits as if it originated in the circuit court.109 Holding that the doctrine
of res judicata was no bar to the appellate process, the Court reconciled
the doctrine and the de novo appeal as follows:
It is logically said in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
that the above stated proceedings in these Juvenile Court
cases would bring about the anomalous result of granting
to either party desiring it two jury trials rather than one,
since either party is entitled in these Juvenile Court
proceedings to a trial by jury in the Juvenile Court, Code
Section 10275. This does seem to be an anomaly, but it
is not without precedent or legislative approval, as
illustrated by the fact that Code Section 9033 provides
that on appeal ‘all jury cases in the county court shall be
tried de novo in the circuit court.’110
Although, the juvenile appellate review standard was codified
shortly after the Doster opinion was released, this opinion fully
solidified the de novo standard of review which continues to apply to
today’s juvenile appellate process.
5.

Evolution of the Codification of the Juvenile Appellate
Process

In 1953, the appellate standard for juvenile matters was first
codified in Public Act House Bill 198, allowing two days to perfect the
appeal.111 Although House Bill 198 does not specifically articulate that
these appellate matters were to be tried de novo, it alluded to a de novo
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review by indicating the matter was to be tried in the same manner as
prescribed by law.112
In 1955, the issue of appeal was presented in Public Act House
Bill 505. The relevant portion of the Bill was presented by
Congressman Walter I. Forrester for approval wherein he advocated a
similar position as that of the Court in Scalf and Doster, that the
informality of juvenile proceedings would fall short of the formality
needed to perfect an appeal before the Court of Appeals. 113 At the
hearing, Mr. Forrester testified that,
[o]ur amendment is to … direct the appeal to the circuit
court of the county which we think is a good amendment
for this reason that in appealing to the court of appeals,
you should have a technical record, as it is a technical
review of the case. And we believe that a lot of these
appeals could fall short of the court of appeals if not tried
out in the circuit court.114
Ultimately, House Bill 505 was codified to delineate that
juvenile appeals were to be perfected before the circuit court.115
Although the bill required appeals to be “simple,” no time frame was
established for perfecting an appeal.116
In 1957, the appellate standard of review was yet again
amended.117 Although today’s timeframe is ten days, the 1957 version
of the statute is much like the process under which appeals operate today
in that it required juvenile appeals to be perfected before the circuit court
within five days of the juvenile court’s disposition.118 House Bill 848
specifically required a juvenile case on appeal to be reviewed de novo
and further mandated that the circuit court was to hear testimony.
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Id.
To Provide Disposition of Delinquent, Dependent, Neglected and Abandoned
Children, and Repeal of Sections 10269, H. R. 505, 79th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 1955) (from audio transcript of Congressman Walter I. Forrester recorded
Mar. 3, 1955).
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6.
Appellate Standard in Other Juvenile Matters
In 1994, the legislature modified the juvenile appellate standard
by eliminating the de novo trial to circuit court for termination of
parental rights cases.119 The legislature’s 1994 amendment entitled
parties in termination of parental rights cases to directly appeal to the
Court of Appeals with a presumption of correctness on issues of fact
being extended to the juvenile court proceedings.120 The first direct
appeal made utilizing this statute was in In re S.M., Jr., where the Court
of Appeals thoroughly analyzed the propriety of the statutory change.121
In re S.M., Jr. is a 1996 Court of Appeals case wherein both a
mother and father appealed the juvenile court’s decision to terminate
their parental rights to their son.122 This case involved two mildly
retarded parents and a moderately retarded son suffering from multiple
health issues.123 Immediately upon the child’s birth, the Department of
Human Services began providing intensive intervention services that
continued for the first five or six years of the child’s life.124 After the
Department discontinued its services, the family began deteriorating
quickly and evidence suggested that the child’s father began sexually
molesting him.125 The mother refused to believe the allegations and
took no steps to protect the child from the father.126 As a result, the
Department of Children’s Services (DCS) intervened and took custody
of the child.127
After significant efforts to reunify the family, DCS filed a
petition to terminate the mother and father’s parental rights.128
Following a full hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating
both parents’ rights to the child and awarded permanent guardianship to
DCS.129 In its order terminating the mother’s parental rights, the
juvenile court justified its holding with the following: (1) mother’s lack
of progress in counseling; (2) mother’s continuing relationship with
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father; (3) the poor quality of visitation; (4) mother’s inability to meet
the child’s special needs; and (5) mother’s poor housekeeping and
inability to provide a stable home environment.130 In its order
terminating the father’s rights, the Court found that the father lacked
parental responsibility and was unable to provide for his son’s special
needs.131
In their appeal, the parents asserted that they were deprived of
their vested right to a de novo trial in circuit court following the juvenile
proceeding and that the juvenile proceeding was constitutionally
deficient.132 The Court began its analysis with the parents’ first
argument.133 The Court noted that prior to 1994, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 37-1-159(a) directed parties that were dissatisfied
with a juvenile court’s decision in a termination of parental rights case
to appeal to the circuit court, wherein the case would be reviewed de
novo with witness testimony.134 However, the Court determined that the
amended law was the standard under which the parties were bound in
this very apropos analysis:
The General Assembly changed the adjudicatory
procedure for termination of parental rights cases in 1994
by amending Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(a) to
eliminate the de novo trial in circuit court. While this
amendment accomplished the desired effect of hastening
final decisions in termination of parental rights cases, it
also accentuated the importance of the juvenile court
proceedings. The juvenile court trial was no longer the
warm-up for a circuit court trial. Instead, it became the
parties’ only opportunity to present evidence on the
termination of parental rights issue. Appellate courts
base their decisions on lower court’s record, and thus the
juvenile court record became the evidentiary foundation
for all later judicial consideration of the case.135
In determining its applicability to the parties, the Court found
that the amendment discussed above was enacted eight months before
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DCS filed its petition to terminate the parents’ rights and ten months
before the trial began in the juvenile court.136 The Court reasoned that:
[a]pplying the amended version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 371-159(a) to this case did not curtail the parents’ appellate
rights nor did it come at such an advanced stage of the
proceeding that it undermined their substantive rights.
The parents had ample notice of the procedural changes
and of the increased importance of the juvenile
proceeding. Since the amendment left intact the parents’
right to appeal to this court, it did not unconstitutionally
hinder their ability to present their case in the juvenile
court or their ability to seek appellate review of the
juvenile court’s decision.137
The Court quickly addressed and discarded the three remaining
Constitutional arguments the parents presented: (1) their right to a jury
trial; (2) their right to a trial presided over by a judge who is a licensed
lawyer; and (3) their right to obtain the broad pre-trial discovery that
would have been available to them in circuit court.138 In addressing the
parents’ right to a jury trial, the Court found that termination of parental
rights actions are civil in nature and statutory in origin wherein no jury
trial is afforded to the parties in either the juvenile or circuit court.139
Given that no right to a jury existed prior to the enactment of the
amendment, there was no right to be affected by the 1994 amendment.140
In addressing the parents’ right to a law-trained judge, the Court
discarded the argument. The Court found that a discussion on the merits
would be inappropriately theoretical and academic in nature, because
the parents’ proceeding was, in fact, presided over by a judge who was
licensed to practice law.141 In addressing the parents’ right to discover
relevant information, the Court disagreed with the assertions of the
parents regarding their narrow interpretation of the discovery rule in
juvenile court versus the broad interpretation of the rule in circuit
court.142 The Court ruled that there was no material difference between
juvenile procedure rules and civil procedure rules related to discovery;
and even if there had been, these parties did not experience it because
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they conceded that the juvenile court ruled that it was proceeding under
civil procedure rule governing discovery.143
Lastly, the parents complained that the juvenile court
proceedings lacked sufficient due process protections.144 In its
discussion on this issue, the Court found that because of the interests at
stake in a termination case, fundamental fairness required that the
juvenile court afford the parents a hearing and adequate notice
thereof,145 representation,146 and that the proof be established by clear
and convincing evidence.147 The Court was satisfied that all of these
due process protections were employed during the juvenile proceeding
and that the parents received a fair hearing; thus, the constitutional
challenges relating to the hearing in juvenile court were found to be
without merit.148
The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling and
held that the juvenile proceedings complied with all state and federal
constitutional requirements. The Court also held that the juvenile court
correctly determined that that the child’s physical safety and
psychological maturation were best served by terminating the parental
rights of both the mother and father.149
In re S.M., Jr. is important to this discussion because it
acknowledges the value of the juvenile court proceeding and determined
that, in termination proceedings, there was sufficient formality to permit
the matter to be directly appealed to the Court of Appeals. 150 As there
is little, if any, difference in how all other juvenile court adjudications
occur, this article is advocating that the same appellate standard
awarded to termination of parental rights proceedings be extended to all
juvenile matters.
The three areas of law where the juvenile court wields
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery court are the
following: to terminate parental rights, to legitimate children born out
of wedlock, and to determine custody of children born out of
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wedlock.151 Although the 1994 amendment conspicuously applied to
termination cases because of the specific removal of those proceedings
from the language, the amendment actually applied to all three types of
proceedings.152 The 1994 amendment modified Tennessee Code
Annotated section 37-1-159 to add subsection (g) which stated
“[a]ppeals in all other civil matters heard by the juvenile court shall be
governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.”153 The 1994
amendment afforded the same direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for
non-dependency and neglect custody and legitimation proceedings as it
did for termination of parental rights cases.
7.

Juvenile Appellate Standard Today

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-159 (a) presently states:
The juvenile court shall be a court of record; and any
appeal from any final order or judgment in a delinquency
proceeding… may be made to the criminal court or court
having criminal jurisdiction that shall hear the testimony
of witnesses and try the case de novo; and any appeal
from any final order of judgment in an unruly child
proceeding or dependent and neglect proceeding, … may
be made to the circuit court that shall hear the testimony
of witnesses and try the case de novo. The appeal shall
be perfected within ten (10) days, excluding nonjudicial
days, following the juvenile court’s disposition.154
The current appellate standard has two major substantive components:
(1) the appeal must be made to the circuit court (or criminal court, if
appropriate) and (2) the standard of review is de novo with witness
testimony.155 In Tennessee, the circuit court is a court of record, like
the juvenile court.156 However, unlike the circuit court, the juvenile
court is a court of limited jurisdiction while the circuit court has both
broad general jurisdiction and specific appellate jurisdiction over certain
cases decided by inferior courts.157 The term “de novo” has been
thoroughly defined by the appellate courts in the context of juvenile
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appeals.158 In one notable decision, the Court of Appeals explained that
a de novo trial is “a new trial on the entire case – that is on both questions
of fact and issues of law – conducted as if there had been no trial in the
first instance.”159 Although Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1159 requires that the entire juvenile record, including the juvenile
court’s findings, be forwarded to the circuit court when a matter is
appealed, the circuit court is not limited to that record on review.160 On
the contrary, the circuit court must hear witnesses and be presented
proof again and render an independent decision based on the evidence
received in the circuit court proceeding.161
The current standard has been largely unchanged in over seventy
years. When the appellate standard was codified, venue and procedure
may have been appropriate because juvenile courts did not, and likely
could not, afford the same due process protections to litigants as the
circuit court; however, those disparities no longer exist. Moreover, the
current appellate process is fraught with problems.
III.

OBSTACLES CREATED BY THE CURRENT STANDARD OF
REVIEW

The obstacles created by the current juvenile appellate standard
are abundant. This section will discuss five areas that demonstrate how
the current appellate standard is sufficiently problematic to warrant
modification. The current standard: (A) fails to facilitate the best
interests of children; (B) is confusing; (C) lacks precedential weight
necessary to guide juvenile judges and practitioners; (D) lacks
transparency within the juvenile and circuit court (when exercising
appellate jurisdiction), and; (E) diminishes juvenile court proceedings.
A. The Current Appellate Standard Does Not Facilitate the Best
Interests of Children
As illustrated below in the analysis of Green v. Green, the
current appellate standard does not facilitate the best interests of
children. In fact, the Green court specifically found that, once
appealed to the circuit court, the juvenile proceedings were of no

In re Isaiah L., 340 S.W.3d 692, 707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Cornelius v. Dep’t.
Children Servs., 314 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Hood, 221
S.W.3d 531, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); and DCS v. T.M.B.K., 197 S.W.3d 282, 289
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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consequence. The remainder of this section will analyze Green and
the complications arising from the juvenile appellate standard it
illuminates.
1. Green v. Green
Green is a 2009 Tennessee Court of Appeals case in which a
father filed a petition for custody of his three minor children, alleging
that they were dependent and neglected in the mother’s care because the
mother was married to a convicted sex offender.162 Following a trial,
the juvenile court found probable cause that the mother had allowed the
step-father to have unsupervised access to the children and, as a
consequence, found her to be unfit to properly care for the children.163
At the trial’s conclusion on November 30, 2005, the juvenile court
granted the father’s petition for custody and established visitation for
the mother with an order precluding contact with the step-father.164 The
mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the circuit court.165
The circuit court conducted a de novo trial on the father’s
original petition and concluded the matter nearly fourteen months after
the entry of the juvenile court’s order.166 In its order reversing the
juvenile court’s decision, the circuit court noted that the juvenile court
correctly found that the children were dependent and neglected based
on their exposure to mother’s registered sex offending husband but that
the mother subsequently filed for divorce from the offending husband,
thus removing the risk of harm warranting the finding and removal.167
The circuit court remanded the matter to the juvenile court for
enforcement wherein the mother’s custody was reinstated as it existed
prior to the father’s petition.168 Based on the circuit court’s finding, the
juvenile court ruled that, although it had continuing concerns about the
mother protecting the children from her former husband (as they had a
child together), the court had no authority to place restrictions,

162

Green v. Green, M2007-01263-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 348289, at *1-2 (Tenn.
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conditions, or terms on the mother’s custody.169 The father appealed the
circuit court ruling to the Court of Appeals.170
On appeal, the facts were undisputed; when the juvenile court
heard the matter, the mother was married and residing with a registered
sex offender and took no precautions to protect her children from their
step-father.171 When the circuit court heard the matter, the mother was
no longer living with the offender and was in the process of obtaining a
divorce.172 The father’s argument was based on his contention that once
the circuit court acknowledged that the children had been dependent and
neglected at one time, then jurisdiction under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 37-1-103(a)(1) attached and remained with the
juvenile court to determine the disposition.173
In its analysis, the Court acknowledged the juvenile court’s
exclusive jurisdiction to determine allegations that a child is dependent
and neglected.174 After reviewing the statutory framework, the Court
determined that juvenile courts are essentially required to follow a twostep process: (1) the court is to hold a hearing and decide whether the
petitioning party has proven by clear and convincing evidence that a
child is dependent and neglected under the statute175 and, (2) if the court
determines that the child is not dependent and neglected, then the
petition must be dismissed and the court has no jurisdiction to determine
custody.176 If, however, the court finds that the petitioning party has
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent and
neglected, the juvenile court is to make a custody decision “best suited
to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.”177
The Court further indicated that, in recognition of the nature of juvenile
proceedings, the legislature provided for the juvenile court to have
continuing jurisdiction until one of several enumerated events occur.178
The Court, however, determined that the juvenile court lost any
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continuing jurisdiction it may have had under these facts because the
petitioning party failed to prove dependency and neglect on appeal.179
The Court then discussed the juvenile and circuit court’s role in
dependency and neglect cases.180 In its analysis, the Court articulated
the purpose of juvenile courts:
These [juvenile] courts were established for the
protection of our children, and are expressly authorized
to remove delinquent or dependent children from
unfavorable surroundings and adjudicate their proper
custody, and separate them from their parents when such
actions appears to be for the best interest of the child.181
The primary purpose in a dependency and neglect
proceeding is to provide for the care and protection of
children.182
Furthering the purpose of the juvenile courts, the legislative allocation
of exclusive jurisdiction meant that, once jurisdiction was asserted, no
other court may take any action affecting the child’s custody without
first obtaining the juvenile court’s approval for a transfer.183 However,
notwithstanding the purpose and specialty jurisdiction prescribed by
statute, the Court noted the following regarding the appellate process
for juvenile appeals:
The appeal from juvenile court to circuit court in a
dependency and neglect case is not the same as this
court’s review of trial court decisions, as set out in the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. That is
because, by statute, the circuit court is to hear the
testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo. This
directive, to hear the case de novo, is important to the
resolution of the issues in this appeal. While the record
of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be
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Id. at *6 (citing Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 143-44 (Tenn. 2003) and In re
E.P., W2004-02821-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3343807, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
9, 2005)).
180
Id
181
Id. (citing State ex rel. v. West, 201 SW 743, 745 (Tenn. 1918)).
182
Id. (citing Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. T.M.B.K, 197 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2006).
183
Id. (citing Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Gouvista, 735 S.W.2d 452, 455-57
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); In re McCloud, 01-A-01-9212-CV00504, 1993 WL 194041,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 1993)).
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provided to the circuit court on appeal, the circuit court
is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit
court in a dependency and neglect case proceeding may
not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile
court, but under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) must try
the case de novo by hearing witnesses again and by
rendering an independent decision based on the evidence
received in the circuit court proceeding….
Consequently, the circuit court is not “reviewing” the
juvenile court’s decision; instead, it is conducting a new
proceeding as though the petition were originally filed in
circuit court.184
With this historical framework established, the Court analyzed
the father’s argument that the juvenile court maintained its dispositional
authority because the juvenile court found clear and convincing
evidence of dependency and neglect.185 The Court found that since the
circuit court ultimately concluded that that there was no dependency and
neglect at the time of its de novo hearing, despite its acknowledgment
of the correctness of the juvenile court’s finding, the juvenile court
findings “were of no effect whatsoever.”186 The Court held that the
circuit court’s dismissal of the father’s petition was the terminating
event that stripped the juvenile court of its jurisdiction.187 Therefore, on
February 11, 2009 (nearly four years after father’s initial petition), the
Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling dismissing the father’s petition,
finding that clear and convincing evidence, proving that the children
were dependent and neglected ,did not exist at the time of the circuit
court hearing.188
2. Why the Green Case Illustrates the Obstacles
Created by the Appellate Standard
The Green case rendered juvenile trials completely meaningless.
Instead of the trial court being limited to the timeframe of the petition,
as is the case in most all other legal proceedings, juvenile matters
appealed to the circuit court are now treated as if they were filed on the
date of the circuit court trial, with the parent receiving the complete
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Id. at *8.
Id. at *8-9.
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Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at *11.
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benefit of the passage of time to correct genuine issues of dependency
and neglect. In this case, the father received his negative finding from
the circuit court in February 2007 and, although it appears the matter
was argued during the Court’s February 2008 session, the Court of
Appeals issued its opinion in this case in February 2009.189
Had the mother been required to appeal the juvenile court’s
November 2005 decision to the Court of Appeals, as this article
advocates the appellate standard should be, the juvenile court’s factual
findings would have received a presumption of correctness. The Court
of Appeals would have likely affirmed the finding of dependency and
neglect. Following the same protracted timeline as was present in this
case, the minor children would have received finality approximately two
years earlier in 2007. The Court of Appeals would have remanded the
matter back to the juvenile court for the court and likely DCS’s
continued monitoring. With the juvenile court having continuing
jurisdiction, the mother would have maintained her right to petition the
juvenile court for a return of custody.
3.

Current Appellate Standard Delays Permanency

In 1998, the Tennessee Court Improvement Program for juvenile
dependency cases was assessed.190 The evaluation notes that one of the
systematic barriers to permanency is the “fragmented and politically
vulnerable structure of the Tennessee court system.”191 The author
noted that “despite the fact that juvenile courts are “courts of record,”
appeals from dependency proceedings (other than terminations) are
heard de novo in circuit court, which ultimately delays permanency for
children.”192
As the report noted, and was illustrated earlier in this section
with the Green analysis, failing to allow the juvenile court’s “court of
record” status and due process protections to elevate it to that of its peer
courts of record, unfortunately, prevents parties from being able to
directly pursue their appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals relies on the trial court’s technical record193 on appeal and
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Id. at *1-3.
Susan L. Brooks, Reflections on the Tennessee Court Improvement Program for
Juvenile Dependency Cases, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1031 (1998).
191
Id. at 1042-43.
192
Id. at n. 80 (citing Cindy Wood MacLean, TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM FOR JUVENILE DEPENDENCY CASES: THE PROGRAM
REPORT FOR THE YEAR FEBRUARY 22, 1997 - FEBRUARY 21, 1998, at 5 (May 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee Supreme Court)).
193
TENN. R. APP. P. 13.
190
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affords trial courts a presumption of correctness on issues of fact.194 If
juvenile court decisions were directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals, parties would only be required to create one technical record
for the purposes of appeal rather than having to undergo the time and
expense of creating a second record with the circuit court before
enjoying the privilege of having their issues heard by the Court of
Appeals.
B. Multiple Appellate Venues Cause Confusion and Delay
As discussed, supra, the appellate venue for decisions made by
juvenile courts varies, depending on the nature of action that resulted in
the decision.195 Perhaps if decisions affecting families were easily
contained in categories without overlapping edges, such a system could
be withstood without significant confusion. Unfortunately, cases filed
in most family courts, especially Tennessee Juvenile Courts, consist of
multiple allegations, which could result in appeals perfected in both the
circuit court and the court of appeals, if made exclusive of other
allegations. Not only is the confusion avoidable, but the delay that
ensues is contrary to the very reformation efforts that caused every state
to create separate juvenile court systems.
A recent case decided by the court of appeals perfectly illustrates
the confusion caused by allowing two courts to have appellate
jurisdiction over juvenile matters. The facts are both simple and routine
fodder for juvenile court practice. Britany, a child born out of wedlock,
was an “out of control” teenager whose father sought custody in the
juvenile court. Not only did Britany’s father ask the juvenile court to
modify custody to abrogate mother’s primary role, but he plead, in the
alternative, that Britany was a dependent and neglected child. 196 After
a full trial, the juvenile judge awarded custody of Britany to her father,
but only upon its determination that the change in custody was in
Britany’s best interest. The circuit court also held that Britany was not
a dependent and neglected child.197
Since the order from which Brittany’s mother appealed arose
from a trial that was based, in part, on an allegation of dependency and
neglect, Britany’s mother filed an appeal with the circuit court, seeking
a de novo trial.198 Her father, relying upon the juvenile court’s dismissal
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TENN. R. APP. P. 24.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159(a) (West 2013).
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In Re Britany P.D., M2012-00614-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 178457 (Apr. 22,
2013).
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Id. at *3.
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Id. at *1.
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of all allegations of dependency and neglect, filed a Motion to Dismiss
the pending circuit court appeal. Since the father was awarded custody
as a result of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to determine custody
matters for children born out of wedlock, with subsequent appeals to the
court of appeals, the circuit court granted her father’s Motion to
Dismiss, finding it lacked appellate jurisdiction and subsequently
transferring the matter to the Court of Appeals.
Contrary to the circuit court’s opinion regarding its lack of
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals ruled that, in spite of the juvenile
court’s dismissal of all dependency and neglect allegations, the fact that
the father alleged dependency and neglect and the juvenile court held a
hearing on those allegations, continuing jurisdiction attached to the
juvenile court.199 Once continuing jurisdiction attached, all orders
arising therefrom were appealable to the circuit court, not the Court of
Appeals.200
This case illustrates the legitimate confusion experienced by
litigants and attorneys alike, not to mention the inefficiency created for
both appellate venues; however, what is not measurable is the impact
that a delay has on the child whose custody hangs in the balance. What
is time to a child? Everything.
In a time when child welfare agencies struggle to walk
the tight rope of protecting the constitutional rights of parents
and protecting children, some guidance from the appellate courts
could vastly improve outcomes for both children and parents.
C. Circuit Court Appeals Result in Sparse Case Law
Retired Illinois circuit court judge John Payne addressed the
issue of expedited juvenile appeals:
Having a complete and thorough body of case law guides
everyone at the trial court level: prosecutors, defense
attorneys and judges. Case law helps ensure consistency
and fairness from case to case and from circuit to
circuit. Expediting appeals in all cases involving young
people – including delinquency matters – is not only good
for young people, it’s good for trial court practitioners,
too.201
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Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
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Models for Change, Expedited Appeals of Juvenile Cases To Improve Fairness of
System in Illinois, available at http://www.modelsforchange.net/newsroom/526
(quoting retired Illinois circuit court judge, John Payne, in discussing the benefit of
200

2014]

ELIMINATING THE SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE

31

The appellate process serves three essential functions: correction
of legal error in the initial proceedings, the opportunity for “lawmaking” to develop and refine the law, and to promote uniformity in the
law’s application. In the criminal context particularly, the third function
is critical to ensure uniform treatment and consistent practices.202
While one could arguably assert that de novo appeals to the
circuit court allow for the correction of legal error, albeit through a new
trial, the development of the law is nonexistent. The orders of the circuit
court remain in the confidential juvenile files and are not shared outside
of the parties to the litigation, thereby providing no guidance to the bar,
other community stakeholders or other circuit courts. No uniformity in
treatment or practices exists. An appellate process that only fulfills one
out of three essential functions should not be maintained merely for the
sake of the avoidance of change.
In fiscal year 2011-2012, 268 cases from Juvenile Courts were
appealed to Circuit Court203 and 60 cases204 were appealed to the Court
of Appeals.205 There were no appeals to the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals arising from delinquent findings,206 although 61,146

expedited juvenile appeals in Illinois that have resulted in fewer cases becoming
moot—thus developing a more robust pool of precedent from which all litigants
benefit).
202
Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 679 (2012);
Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 316
(2009); Randall T. Shepard, Changing the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Indiana
Supreme Court: Letting a Court of Last Resort Act Like One, 63 IND. L. J. 669, 669
(1988) (As former Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Judge Shepard
writes, “the law-giving function is pivotal”).
203
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2011-2012 17,
119, available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/annual_report_tn_judiciary_fy_2011
-12_2-27-13_0.pdf.
204
This figure does not include direct appeals from Juvenile Court to the Court of
Appeals for Termination of Parental Rights cases.
205
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2011-2012 13,
available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/annual_report_tn_judiciary_fy_2011
-12_2-27-13_0.pdf (The method by which the Court of Appeals maintains its data
does not differentiate between direct appeals from Juvenile Court to the Court of
Appeals in non-termination cases (paternity and custody appeals) versus secondlevel appeals that originated in Juvenile Court, were subsequent retried in the Circuit
Court, with a subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals.).
206
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2011-2012 14,
available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/annual_report_tn_judiciary_fy_2011
-12_2-27-13_0.pdf.
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delinquent offenses were filed against children in the juvenile courts
across the state.207 In 2012, 14,922 dependency and neglect petitions
were filed with juvenile courts across the state.208 Moreover, 4,347
children were committed to the Department of Children’s Services, in
both civil and delinquent juvenile orders.209 Not only does this data
reveal the infrequency of juvenile appeals, it illustrates that only 60
cases across the state of Tennessee are produced on an annual basis,
from which the laws impacting juveniles and families can be clarified
and perfected.
D. Circuit Court Appeals Preclude Transparency
A constant criticism of child protective service agencies,
particularly the Tennessee DCS, is a perceived lack of accountability
and transparency.210 One method by which transparency can be
improved is to create an appellate structure that allows for the review of
appearances of the agency and other parties before the appellate court.
Every appeal filed in the court of appeals results in a detailed finding of
fact and law that is generated by the court. These findings or opinions
are available for review by the public. Allowing the public to review
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STATE OF TENNESSEE ANNUAL JUVENILE COURT STATISTICAL REPORT 10 (2012),
available at
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/2012_annual_report.pdf.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 56.
210
Tony Gonzalaz, DCS hit with Stinging Audit, THE TENNESSEAN, Jan. 27, 2014,
available at
http://archive.tennessean.com/article/20140127/NEWS21/301270060/DCS-hitstinging-audit-lawmakers-want-agency-tight-leash- (criticizing that DCS failed to
thoroughly investigate allegations of child abuse resulting in child deaths that were
going unreported); The Associated Press, Tennessee’s Children’s Head Resigns over
Handling of Child Death Cases, FOX NEWS, Feb. 5, 2013, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/05/tennessee-commissioner-children-servicesresigns-over-handling-child-death/ (reporting on the resignation of DCS’s
Commissioner amid scrutiny over how both she and the agency were handling child
deaths where DCS had failed to adequately investigate allegations of harm); Erik
Schelzig, Tennessee Fights Transparency for Child Welfare Agency, THE DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2013, available at
https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2013/jan/8/tennessee-fightstransparency-for-child-welfare-agency//print (criticizing DCS for its failure to be
transparent about our state’s most vulnerable citizens, its children); The Associated
Press, Tennessee DCS Scrutinized for Lack of Transparency, WRCBTV.COM, 2012,
available at http://wrcb.membercenter.worldnow.com/story/20240335/dcsscrutinized-for-lack-of-transparency (addressing DCS’s lack of transparency
notwithstanding increased scrutiny over the agency’s failure to adequately report
child deaths).
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the findings of the appellate court would increase not only the
transparency of the agency, but the juvenile court process that is often
perceived as shrouded in mystery. This is because forcing the agency
and other parties to improve their processes under the transparency of
the appeal, attorneys and juvenile judges alike would risk
embarrassment if they were ill prepared or unknowledgeable in the law.
While the modification of the appellate venue would not
address, in its entirety, the concerns raised by the media, allowing the
development of the public record would provide at least a starting point
from which legislators, citizens and public media representatives could
question the performance of the DCS lawyers appointed to serve all
parties as well as juvenile judges who are charged with the responsibility
of maintaining their legal expertise in an ever-changing area of the law.
E. The Current Standard Diminishes the Value of the Juvenile
Court
1. Circuit Court Appeals Undermine the Established Purpose
of Juvenile Courts
As discussed in Section II(A), the purpose of juvenile courts,
from its inception, has been to provide for the care, protection and
development of children; to remove the taint of criminality from minors
who commit delinquent acts and to provide a simple judicial procedure
that allows for fair hearings and constitutional protections.211 However,
juvenile court proceedings are rendered meaningless if any party
appeals under TCA § 37-1-159(a). Although the juvenile court’s
limited jurisdiction results in it being characterized as “inferior,” its
specialty nature is the very quality that is most worthy of preservation,
not disposal. By limiting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to juvenile
related issues, mostly dependency and delinquency, the legislature
created a boutique environment wherein the court can narrow its focus,
almost exclusively, to child welfare and rehabilitation. Juvenile courts
are steeped in the nuances of child testimony, broken families, child
victims, child perpetrators, educational concerns, parental rights,
children rights, foster parents rights, and governmental responsibilities
on a daily basis.
As the In re S.M., Jr. Court noted, allowing direct appeals to the
Court of Appeals for juvenile decisions requires parties to take the
juvenile
proceedings
seriously
and
not
just
a

211

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(1) (West 2009).
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“warm-up trial” for circuit court.212 Juvenile courts mix the formalities
necessary to provide due process safeguards, yet sufficient informality
and familiarity to ensure that form does not supersede substance.
Allowing the juvenile proceedings the dignity of a presumption of
correctness on appeal, as the Court of Appeals is accustomed to doing,
preserves the specialty nature of the court, and with it, the purpose
underlying the court’s design.
2. The Application of the Appellate Standard No
Longer Satisfies the Legislature’s Original Intent
As demonstrated in the history section of this article, when the
appellate standard was first implemented by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, it was intended to guarantee that parties received the benefit of a
more formal process, presumably ensuring due process safeguards,
before confining parties to a technical record on appeal. 213 Although it
appears those concerns were valid years ago, juvenile courts have
evolved over time and now incorporate the necessary formalities into
their proceedings. One by one, these important formalities have been
absorbed into juvenile procedures: (1) entitlement to legal counsel,214
(2) free appointment of legal counsel for qualifying parties;215 (3)
juvenile proceedings overseen by a judge with a law license;216 and (4)
full adjudicatory hearings governed by the rules of procedure and
evidence.217
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In re S.M., Jr., No. 01-A-01-9506-JV-00233, 1996 WL 140410, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Mar. 29, 1996)..
213
Doster 260 S.W.2d at 280; Scalf, 144 S.W.2d at 774; To Provide Disposition of
Delinquent, Dependent, Neglected and Abandoned Children, and Repeal of Sections
10269, H. R. 505, 79th Gen. Ass. (Tenn. 1955) (from audio transcript of
Congressman Walter I. Forrester recorded Mar. 3, 1955).
214
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126(b) (West 2009). Although the right to counsel was
acknowledged in case law for many years, in 2008 the code was modified to include
the right to counsel for both children and adults. TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-126 (a)
(West 2008).
215
Nyasha N. Justice and Leslie Barrett Kincaid, A RE-ASSESSMENT OF
TENNESSEE’S JUDICIAL PROCESS IN FOSTER CARE CASES 81 (2005). (Physical
copies of the report are maintained by the Administrative Office of Courts).
216
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-106 (West 2013). (The statute says a judge
"must.be...authorized to practice law in the courts of this state.").
217
TENN. R. JUV. P. 28; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (Because of
the interests at stake in a termination of parental rights case, fundamental fairness
required that parents be afforded a hearing on adequate notice.); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) and Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981) (Parents faced with the prospect of losing their parental rights are entitled to
the due process protections guaranteed by TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8 and the Due
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With these formalities in place, the concerns previously
articulated by the Legislature and Tennessee Supreme Court no longer
exist. Termination of parental rights cases have been appealable to the
Court of Appeals for nearly twenty years and it makes sense to extend
that standard to all juvenile matters.
IV.
PROPOSED STANDARD
A. The 2008 House/Senate Bill
In 2008, Representatives Sherry Jones and Tom DuBois, cosponsored House Bill 2909 and Senator Joe M. Haynes sponsored
Senate Bill 3111, both seeking to amend TCA § 37-2-259(a) to require
all juvenile appeals to be made pursuant to the Tennessee rules of
appellate procedure.218 Both bills were treated favorably in the House
and Senate until the Executive Director of the Fiscal Review
Committee, in cooperation with the Tennessee Attorney General’s
Office, attached a fiscal note amounting to an estimated $405,200.219
The House Bill was removed from consideration prior to a vote.220
Around the same approximate time, Senator Haynes sponsored
an amendment to Senate Bill 3111 and Representative Lois M. DeBerry
sponsored an amendment to House Bill 2909, both seeking that TCA §
37-1-159(a) be modified to require the proceedings already covered in
the statute to be filed in circuit court, but heard de novo on the juvenile
court’s record with a presumption of correctness on issues of fact.221 As
a result of the Fiscal Note attached to the Bills, it appears the
Amendments died along with the parent bills.222
B. Proposed Amendment
The author’s proposed amendment largely resembles the
original 2008 Bills discussed above. The proposed amendment would
omit the language of TCA § 37-1-159 and provide the following in its
place:

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which, at a minimum required
representation when the particular facts warranted such).
218
H.B. 2909, 105th Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2008); S.B. 3111, 105th Gen. Assem.
(Tenn. 2008).
219
Fiscal Note attached to H.B. 2909 and S.B. 3111 by the Executive Director of the
Fiscal Review Committee.
220
Bill History for H.B. 2909 and S.B. 3111.
221
Amendment no. 1 to H.B. 2909 and Amendment no. 1 to S.B. 3111.
222
Bill History for H.B. 2909 and S.B. 3111.
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Any appeal from juvenile court must be made pursuant
to and governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure, wherein delinquency matters shall be filed
with the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and all
other matters shall be filed with the Tennessee Court of
Appeals. In all juvenile appeals, the appellate court
shall, consistent with its rules, expedite the appeal by
entering such scheduling orders as are necessary to
ensure that the case is not delayed, giving juvenile
appeals priority over all other matters.
By adopting this proposal, Tennessee would join the other 45 states that
have already implemented rules and statutes requiring juvenile appeals
to be heard by their equivalent Court of Appeals or state Supreme
Courts.223
Although the 2008 amendments seemingly failed due to the
Fiscal Note attached by the Executive Director of the Fiscal Review
Committee, the authors believe the Note failed to account for (a) the
cost savings that will likely be experienced through expedited appellate
reviews; (b) the utilization of regional counsel from DCS to cover the
estimated thirty additional appellate cases; and (c) the human and
financial resources that will be saved by unburdening DCS counsel and
caseworkers from re-litigating matters at the circuit level.224
Unburdening DCS counsel would also make them a possible resource
to field the additional Court of Appeals cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

Trials de novo have been used in Tennessee primarily as a means
of establishing a record from which a subsequent appeal may be taken
to the court of appeals and as a method of substituting for the lack of
due process afforded in an inferior court presided over by a lay judge.
Neither purpose is applicable in today’s juvenile court system. All
Tennessee Juvenile Courts are courts of record, capable of producing
the same record as a trial court in this state and, perhaps more

223

Research assistants compiled a fifty state survey of the juvenile appeal standard
across the country. Results revealed that Tennessee is one of five states that require
juvenile appeals to be heard by a secondary trial court on a de novo basis. Maine’s
juvenile appellate review calls for the matter to be filed in its court of general
jurisdiction, but appellate matters are reviewed on the record with a presumption of
correctness on findings of fact. ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 15 § 3402.
224
Fiscal Note attached to 2008 HB 2909 and SB 3111 by the Executive Director of
the Fiscal Review Committee.
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importantly, all juvenile judges are law-trained and are, by nature of
their specialized jurisdiction, best suited to fully and finally determine
issues that arise under their exclusive jurisdiction.
Abolishing a parent’s second bite at the apple will not only serve
the best interests of children and preclude anomalous and unacceptable
results like that depicted in Green, but will help address the lack of
uniformity, predictability, and transparency of the juvenile court system
and DCS. The abrogation of the de novo appeal has successfully been
implemented in termination of parental rights cases and, after two
decades of direct appeals from the juvenile courts to the court of appeals,
the law has been clarified. Practitioners and courts alike have a uniform
model of decisions and more importantly, both the purpose and role of
the juvenile court have been bolstered by the deference afforded its
decisions. Children like “Abbey” should be protected, and juvenile
court decisions should be the only bite at the apple litigants have to
create a record for appeal.
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